Storing credit card information securely and legally is very difficult and should not be attempted. I have no intention of storing credit card data but I'm dying to figure out the following:
My credit card info is being stored on a server some where in the world. This data is (hopefully) not being stored on a merchant's server, but at some point it needs to be stored to verify and charge the account identified by merchant submitted data.
My question is this: if you were tasked with storing credit card data what encryption strategy would you use to secure the data on-disk? From what I can tell submitted credit card info is being checked more or less in real time. I doubt that any encryption key used to secure the data is being entered manually, so decryption is being done on the fly, which implies that the keys themselves are being stored on-disk. How would you secure your data and your keys in an automated system like this?
The last few times I worked with creditcard payments, you never really stored the actual CC info on your own servers. You let the Payment gateway handle that. What you ended up with was a transactionID that you could use to verify that the creditcard was still both valid and had the requested amount of cash available. Then once you actually packed the stuff they bought, you'd issue a capture-command to the Payment Gateway.
This approach greatly simplified the process of integrating CC payments on a site, since all you ever needed to know was the transactionID for a particular customer. This ofcourse didn't allow you do to the amazon-"trick" of keeping your CC info for 1-click shopping. If the transactionID got compromised, all it could be used for was collecting payment early, or cancelling the transaction altogether (in which case you'd find out about it when you verified that the authorization was still valid before shipping). The transaction couldn't be used to collect a bigger sum than what the customer had approved already, nor would it allow someone to collect to a different account than what the "shop" was configured for.
Maybe not the exact answer you were looking for, but perhaps it could solve your overall issue without having to spend a fortune on security vendors.
First of all if you deal with credit card numbers, you will need to become PCI-DSS compliant, and once you store numbers all 12 sections of the PCI-DSS spec will apply to you. Thats a major cost to most organisations, and if you don't have the time, resources and financial means, you should not go down the path of storing credit card numbers.
We have gained PCI-DSS compliance on a Windows based e-commerce system that stores credit cards. It uses a 256 bit AES encryption. The key itself is encrypted using Windows DPAPI meaning it can only be decrypted by a process running under the same user account as the one that encrypted it. The encrypted key is stored in the registry.
The key is rotated every 12 months, and a backup key copy is stored broken into 3 parts A,B,C and spread over 3 USB drives, each held by a different person. Drive 1 has A+B, Drive 2 has B+C, Drive 3 has A+C. So any 2 drives are required to construct a full key (A+B+C). This scheme is tolerant to the loss of any 1 of the drives. Key parts themselves are encrypted with a password known only to the drive owner.
any automated system for decrypting encrypted information is going to be completly insecure. By automating the process you are defeating the encryption. Any encrypted data should only be decrypted by a user entered secret key.
As an merchant you can choose to store the CC data in your own database or outsource it to third party providers.
Third party providers like IPPayments or major banks like Westpac in Australia are level 1 PCI compliant. For web applications you can choose to use a payment acceptance web page (presented somewhere in your customer's workflow) from them branded for your company. For windows apps (e.g. you company's CRM app) and recurrent payments they generally have a gateway usable using their API that provide a tokenisation service, that is they accept a CC number, registers it and return an unique token that just looks like a CC number. The token can be safely be stored in your DB and used for any further transactions, batch payments, reconciliation etc with the bank. Of course they big issue is operational cost per transaction. For a utility that takes monthly credit card payment from a million customer the transaction cost can be substantial.
If you choose to store the CC number in your own DB triple DES encryption is sufficient. A better option is to you transparent encryption in DB as offered by Oracle advanced security or SQLServer where even the DBA cannot decrypt the CC number. Then there are onerous responsibility for key management, backup, physical security, network security, SSL transmission, changing default settings of all server equipments and firewall, anti virus, auditing, security cameras and on and on ...
To answer your specific question, it is possible to store the credit card encryption key encrypted on disk. The key encrypting key can derived from a passphrase that must be entered when the server is started. Shamir's secret splitting scheme can be used so that k out of N shares are required to construct the secret that will be used as key encrypting key. The decrypted encryption key/secret is then stored in memory. If the server has to be restarted, then you need k shares. This is of course a big overhead and most merchants I know do not implement this. They do however usually store the key separately from the encrypted data for some intermediate security, so access to one does not automatically mean access to the other in entirety (still very bad though).
I deleted contents of my original post since that did not directly answer the question. Suffice it to say that key management and correct encryption are an important piece but still a small part of the story.
PCI auditors cannot possibly ensure that everything is done correctly.