Does this set of regular expressions FULLY protect

问题:

What's an example of something dangerous that would not be caught by the code below?

EDIT: After some of the comments I added another line, commented below. See Vinko's comment in David Grant's answer. So far only Vinko has answered the question, which asks for specific examples that would slip through this function. Vinko provided one, but I've edited the code to close that hole. If another of you can think of another specific example, you'll have my vote!

public static string strip_dangerous_tags(string text_with_tags)
{
    string s = Regex.Replace(text_with_tags, @"<script", "<scrSAFEipt", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"</script", "</scrSAFEipt", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"<object", "</objSAFEct", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"</object", "</obSAFEct", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    // ADDED AFTER THIS QUESTION WAS POSTED
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"javascript", "javaSAFEscript", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);

    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onabort", "onSAFEabort", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onblur", "onSAFEblur", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onchange", "onSAFEchange", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onclick", "onSAFEclick", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"ondblclick", "onSAFEdblclick", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onerror", "onSAFEerror", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onfocus", "onSAFEfocus", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);

    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onkeydown", "onSAFEkeydown", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onkeypress", "onSAFEkeypress", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onkeyup", "onSAFEkeyup", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);

    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onload", "onSAFEload", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);

    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onmousedown", "onSAFEmousedown", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onmousemove", "onSAFEmousemove", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onmouseout", "onSAFEmouseout", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onmouseup", "onSAFEmouseup", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onmouseup", "onSAFEmouseup", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);

    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onreset", "onSAFEresetK", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onresize", "onSAFEresize", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onselect", "onSAFEselect", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onsubmit", "onSAFEsubmit", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
    s = Regex.Replace(s, @"onunload", "onSAFEunload", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);

    return s;
}

回答1:

It's never enough – whitelist, don't blacklist

For example javascript: pseudo-URL can be obfuscated with HTML entities, you've forgotten about <embed> and there are dangerous CSS properties like behavior and expression in IE.

There are countless ways to evade filters and such approach is bound to fail. Even if you find and block all exploits possible today, new unsafe elements and attributes may be added in the future.

There are only two good ways to secure HTML:

• convert it to text by replacing every < with <.
  If you want to allow users enter formatted text, you can use your own markup (e.g. markdown like SO does).

• parse HTML into DOM, check every element and attribute and remove everything that is not whitelisted.
  You will also need to check contents of allowed attributes like href (make sure that URLs use safe protocol, block all unknown protocols).
  Once you've cleaned up the DOM, generate new, valid HTML from it. Never work on HTML as if it was text, because invalid markup, comments, entities, etc. can easily fool your filter.

Also make sure your page declares its encoding, because there are exploits that take advantage of browsers auto-detecting wrong encoding.

回答2:

You're much better off turning all < into < and all > into >, then converting acceptable tags back. In other words, whitelist, don't blacklist.

回答3:

As David shows, there's no easy way to protect with just some regexes you can always forget something, like javascript: in your case. You better escape the HTML entities on output. There is a lot of discussion about the best way to do this, depending on what you actually need to allow, but what's certain is that your function is not enough.

Jeff has talked a bit about this here.

回答4:

<a href="javascript:document.writeln('on' + 'unload' + ' and more malicious stuff here...');">example</a>

Any time you can write a string to the document, a big door swings open.

There are myriad places to inject malicious things into HTML/JavaScript. For this reason, Facebook didn't initially allow JavaScript in their applications platform. Their solution was to later implement a markup/script compiler that allows them to seriously filter out the bad stuff.

As said already, whitelist a few tags and attributes and strip out everything else. Don't blacklist a few known malicious attributes and allow everything else.

回答5:

Although I can't provide a specific example of why not, I am going to go ahead and outright say no. This is more on principal. Regex's are an amazing tool but they should only be used for certain problems. They are fantastic for data matching and searching.

They are not however a good tool for security. It is too easy to mess up a regex and have it be only partially correct. Hackers can find lots of wiggle room inside a poorly or even well constructed regex. I would try another avenue to prevent cross site scripting.

回答6:

Take a look at the XSS cheatsheet at http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html it's not a complete list but a good start.

One that comes to mind is <img src="http://badsite.com/javascriptfile" />

You also forgot onmouseover, and the style tag.

The easiest thing to do really is entity escaping. If the vector can't render properly in the first place, an incomplete blacklist won't matter.

回答7:

As an example of an attack that makes it through this:

  <div style="color: expression('alert(4)')">

Shameless plug: The Caja project defines whitelists of HTML elements and attributes so that it can control how and when scripts in HTML get executed.

See the project at http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/ and the whitelists are the JSON files in http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/source/browse/#svn/trunk/src/com/google/caja/lang/html and http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/source/browse/#svn/trunk/src/com/google/caja/lang/css

回答8:

I still have not figured out why developers want to massage bad input into good input with a regular expression replace. Unless your site is a blog and needs to allow embedded html or javascript or any other sort of code, reject the bad input and return an error. The old saying is Garbage In - Garbage Out, why would you want to take in a nice steaming pile of poo and make it edible?

If your site is not internationalized, why accept any unicode?

If your site only does POST, why accept any URL encoded values?

Why accept any hex? Why accept html entities? What user inputs '&#x0A' or '&quot;' ?

As for regular expressions, using them is fine, however, you do not have to code a separate regular expression for the full attack string. You can reject many different attack signatures with just a few well constructed regex patterns:

patterns.put("xssAttack1", Pattern.compile("<script",Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE) );
patterns.put("xssAttack2", Pattern.compile("SRC=",Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE) );
patterns.put("xssAttack3", Pattern.compile("pt:al",Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE) );
patterns.put("xssAttack4", Pattern.compile("xss",Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE) );

<FRAMESET><FRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></FRAMESET>
<DIV STYLE="width: expression(alert('XSS'));">
<LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');">
<IMG SRC="jav   ascript:alert('XSS');">    // hmtl allows embedded tabs...
<IMG SRC="jav&#x0A;ascript:alert('XSS');"> // hmtl allows embedded newline...
<IMG SRC="jav&#x0D;ascript:alert('XSS');"> // hmtl allows embedded carriage return...

Notice that my patterns are not the full attack signature, just enough to detect if the value is malicious. It is unlikely that a user would enter 'SRC=' or 'pt:al' This allows my regex patterns to detect unknown attacks that have any of these tokens in them.

Many developers will tell you that you cannot protect a site with a blacklist. Since the set of attacks is infinite, that is basically true, however, if you parse the entire request (params, param values, headers, cookies) with a blacklist constructed based on tokens, you will be able to figure out what is an attack and what is valid. Remember, the attacker will most likely be shotgunning exploits at you from a tool. If you have properly hardened your server, he will not know what environment you are running and will have to blast you with lists of exploits. If he pesters you enough, put the attacker, or his IP on a quarantine list. If he has a tool with 50k exploits ready to hit your site, how long will it take him if you quarantine his id or ip for 30 min for each violation? Admittedly there is still exposure if the attacker uses a botnet to multiplex his attack. Still your site ends up being a much tougher nugget to crack.

Now having checked the entire request for malicious content you can now use whitelist type checks against length, referential/ logical, naming to determine validity of the request

Don't forget to implement some sort of CSRF protection. Maybe a honey token, and check the user-agent string from previous requests to see if it has changed.

回答9:

Whitespace makes you vulnerable. Read this.

回答10:

Another vote for whitelisting. But it looks like you're going about this the wrong way. The way I do it, is to parse the HTML into a tag tree. If the tag you're parsing is in the whitelist, give it a tree node, and parse on. Same goes for its attributes.

Dropped attributes are just dropped. Everything else is HTML-escaped literal content.

And the bonus of this route is because you're effectively regenerating all the markup, it's all completely valid markup! (I hate it when people leave comments and they screw up the validation/design.)

Re "I can't whitelist" (para): Blacklisting is a maintenance-heavy approach. You'll have to keep an eye on new exploits and make sure your covered. It's a miserable existence. Just do it right once and you'll never need to touch it again.

回答11:

From a different point of view, what happens when someone wants to have 'javascript' or 'functionload' or 'visionblurred' in what they submit? This can happen in most places for any number of reasons... From what I understand, those will become 'javaSAFEscript', 'functionSAFEload' and 'visionSAFEblurred'(!!).

If this might apply to you, and you're stuck with the blacklist approach, be sure to use the exact matching regexes to avoid annoying the user. In other words, be at the optimum point between security and usability, compromising either as little as possible.